Ware v. Valley Stream High School District: At What Expense Should Religious Freedoms Be Preserved? by Werner, Donna Marie
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 64 
Number 2 Volume 64, Winter 1990, Number 2 Article 6 
April 2012 
Ware v. Valley Stream High School District: At What Expense 
Should Religious Freedoms Be Preserved? 
Donna Marie Werner 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Werner, Donna Marie (1990) "Ware v. Valley Stream High School District: At What Expense Should 
Religious Freedoms Be Preserved?," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 64 : No. 2 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol64/iss2/6 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
WARE v. VALLEY STREAM HIGH SCHOOL
DISTRICT. AT WHAT EXPENSE SHOULD
RELIGIOUS FREEDOMS BE PRESERVED?
The religion clause of the first amendment,1 which states that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof[,] '" 2 was enacted in
response to widespread persecution3 and the fear of a national reli-
gion.4 The clause was intended to "state an objective, not to write
1 U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The original version of the religion clause of the first amend-
ment was introduced by James Madison on June 8, 1789 and read: "The civil rights of none
shall be abridged on account of religious belief, nor shall any national religion be estab-
lished, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience in any matter or on any pretext be
infringed." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (J. Gales ed. 1789), reprinted in W. PARSONS, THE FIRST
FREEDOM 30 (1948). There were six versions of the aniendment. Id. at 30-40. The sixth and
final one was approved by the House of Representatives on September 24, 1789, and by the
Senate on September 25, 1789. Id. at 40.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 9 (1946). The persecutions which caused
the colonists to flee from England were practiced in America. See id.
Catholics found themselves hounded and proscribed because of their faith;
Quakers who followed their conscience went to jail; Baptists were peculiarly ob-
noxious to certain dominant Protestant sects; men and women of varied faiths
who happened to be in a minority in a particular locality were persecuted because
they steadfastly persisted in worshipping God only as their own consciences
dictated.
Id. at 10.
In 1659, Virginia enacted a Quaker banishment statute. See F. SWANCARA, THOMAS JEF-
FERSON vs. RELIGIOUS OPPRESSION 54 (1969). James Madison was referring to the persecution
of Baptists in Virginia when he wrote, "there are at this time . . . not less than five or six
well meaning men in close jail for publishing their religious sentiments." Id. at 51.
In addition, a tax for church support was imposed on the citizens of Virginia, North
Carolina, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, Maryland, and New Hampshire. Everson,
330 U.S. at 10 n.8. Religious persecution was condemned by James Madison as a threat to a
free society in general, not just to religious freedom. See C. JAMES, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE STRUGGLE FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN VIRGINIA 256 (1971).
4 See I. BRANT, JAMES MADISON: THE NATIONALISTS 1780-1787 344 (1948) ("religion is
corrupted when established by law"). The framers of the Constitution recognized that "one
of the greatest dangers to the freedom of the individual to worship in his own way lay in the
Government's placing its official stamp of approval upon one particular [religion]." L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1170 n.9 (2d ed. 1988); see Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,
427-28 (1962) (at time of Revolutionary War, established churches and religions existed in
former colonies); Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161, 180, 100 N.E.2d 463, 472 (1951)
(Desmond, J., concurring) (there were established churches in five states at time of adoption
of Constitution), aff'd, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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a statute."5 The religion clause contains two separate prohibitions;
the first, known as the establishment clause, forbids the creation of
a national religion or the favoring of one religion over another;6 the
second, the free exercise clause, protects an individual's right to
practice the religion of his choice.7 There is an inherent tension in
the dual restrictions embodied in this sixteen-word clause,8 which
is evidenced by the abundance of litigation involving public schools
and religion clause issues.9 The public school arena is fertile
' Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). The objective of the religion clause of
the first amendment was to leave the choice of religion to "the conviction and conscience of
every man" and to protect the inalienable "right of every man to exercise it as these may
dictate." See C. JAMES, supra note 3, at 256. The development of rules and principles to
implement this objective has been left to the judiciary. See L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 1155-
56.
6 See Engel, 370 U.S. at 430-31; Note, Freedom of Religion vs. Public School Reading
Curriculum, 12 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 405, 406-07 (1989). To avoid violating the estab-
lishment clause, government action must have a secular purpose, a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion, and must not foster excessive entanglement between
government and religion. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
See Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of
Religion, 102 HARv. L. REV. 933, 967-68 (1989) (free exercise clause was modeled after Stat-
ute of Virginia for Religious Freedom enacted in 1786). The free exercise clause protects the
right of every individual to choose and practice his own religion. See C. JAMES, supra note 3,
at 256; Note, supra note 6, at 407; see also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574,
603 (1983) (outlining two-step analysis of free exercise claims).
8 See M. McCARTHY, A DELICATE BALANCE: CHURCH, STATE AND THE SCHOOLS 14 (1983);
Note, supra note 6, at 410. The difficulty of finding neutral ground between the two prohibi-
tions is heightened by their "absolute terms" which "tend to clash with [one another]." See
L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 1157 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 668-69). The Supreme Court and
legal scholars are cognizant of this tension. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 416-17
(1963) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("dilemma posed by the conflict between the Free Exercise
Clause of the Constitution and the Establishment Clause"); L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 1158-
59 (views of Roger Williams, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison explored): There is
some authority for the proposition that the framers did not intend or foresee any tension,
see L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 1156, and that the clauses merely complement one another.
See, e.g, Buchanan, Accommodation of Religion in the Public Schools: A Plea for Careful
Balancing of Competing Constitutional Values, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1000, 1023 n.135 (1981)
(striking down law prescribing certain form of worship for all would promote both clauses).
Since the two provisions protect different interests, the Supreme Court has treated
them separately and has developed different tests for each of them. See Note, supra note 6,
at 406; see also supra note 6 and accompanying text (establishment clause test).
See Comment, Fundamentalist Christians, The Public Schools and the Religion
Clauses, 66 DEN. U.L. REV. 289, 291 (1989). Conflicts between school curriculum and religion
have occurred since the inception of the public school system in the eighteenth century. Id.
The first American schools were affiliated with churches and incorporated the values of
Protestant Christianity into their curricula. Id. at 308. However, throughout the nineteenth
century the influence of religion in public schools was decreased or completely removed. Id.
at 309. Today, controversy surrounding religion generally focuses on alleged violations of the
right to free exercise rather than the inculcation of a particular religion. Id. at 289-91.
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ground for religion clause debate since any incorporation of reli-
gion or religious activities into public school curricula creates the
danger of an establishment clause violation.10 On the other hand,
the free exercise clause is implicated whenever an individual re-
quests an exemption from a facially neutral curriculum require-
ment because of an alleged conflict with a sincerely held religious
belief.1 Recently, in Ware v. Valley Stream High School Dis-
trict,1 2 the New York Court of Appeals highlighted this controver-
sial area by addressing a free exercise clause challenge to a state-
mandated acquired immune deficiency syndrome ("AIDS")' 3 edu-
cation program.1 4
In Ware, the plaintiffs were members of the Plymouth Breth-
ren,15 a devoutly religious group which requires its members to
10 See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 61 (1985) (moment of silence for prayer or
meditation); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42-43 (1980) (posting of Ten Commandments in
classroom); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (Bible readings);
Engel, 370 U.S. at 433 (school prayer); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211-12
(1948) (religious instruction given in public schools). When an establishment clause viola-
tion is found, exempting the complainant from the activity would not be a sufficient remedy,
because the government action must be prohibited. See Note, supra note 6, at 408.
" See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (compulsory school attend-
ance); Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1987) (compul-
sory reading program), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988); Spence v. Bailey, 465 F.2d 797,
800 (6th Cir. 1972) (ROTC classes). For unsuccessful free exercise challenges, see, e.g.,
Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 689 F. Supp. 106, 130 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (minimum standards of
instruction for home education), appeal dismissed, 866 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1989); Keller v.
Gardner, 552 F. Supp. 512, 516 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (attendance at basketball practice conflicting
with scheduled religious classes). It has been suggested that since a violation of the free
exercise clause makes the government action invalid only as to a particular individual, the
appropriate remedy is an exemption. See Note, supra note 6, at 409.
12 75 N.Y.2d 114, 550 N.E.2d 420, 551 N.Y.S.2d 167 (1989).
1 See Burris, A Little Law for Non-Lawyers, AIDS AND THE LAW 1 (1987). Discovered
in 1981, AIDS is caused by the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and destroys the im-
mune defense system. See Green, The Transmission of AIDS, AIDS AND THE LAW 28 (1987);
see also I. SLOAN, AIDS LAw: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY 1 (1988) (gen-
eral background and medical history of AIDS).
14 [1987] 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 135.3. The regulation requires that all elementary and secon-
dary schools provide instruction about AIDS as part of the health education program. Id.
§§ 135.3(b)(2), (c)(2). Upon written request of the parent, and assurance that such instruc-
tion will be received at home, an exemption is permitted from that portion of the program
which deals with prevention. Id.
15 Ware, 75 N.Y.2d at 116-17, 550 N.E.2d at 422, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 169; see B. WILSON,
"THE BRETHREN" A RECENT SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY 3 (1981). The Brethren were first estab-
lished in Dublin, Ireland, in the late 1820s. Id. Disenchanted with established religions, the
original members of the Brethren sought to return to the Christian life described in the New
Testament. Id. This was accomplished by the separation of members from existing churches
and the world. Id. at 3-4.
As of 1989, there are approximately 35,000 members worldwide, approximately 2,000 of
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"distance themselves from all things they consider evil."1 Such
moral standards created a conflict for Brethren children, approxi-
mately thirty-five of whom were students at New York's Valley
Stream High School. 17 In accordance with a regulation issued by
the New York State Commissioner of Education, 8 the Valley
Stream High School District incorporated AIDS education into its
health education program.19 However, when confronted with the
Brethren's request that their children be exempted from the com-
pulsory AIDS education requirement, because it conflicted with
their religious beliefs, the School District refused to honor their
request.20 In response, the Brethren brought suit against the
School District, the New York State Commissioner of Education,
and New York State, seeking a declaration that the relevant regu-
lation violated their constitutional right to the free exercise of reli-
gion,2' because the tenets of their religion22 forbid exposure to the
whom live in the United States. See Brief For Plaintiff-Appellants at 4, Ware, 75 N.Y.2d at
116-17, 550 N.E.2d at 422, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 169 (No. 89-3126) [hereinafter Brief for Plaintiff-
Appellants]. This action was brought on behalf of the local gatherings in Valley Stream,
New York, which consists of 140 members, and Rochester, New York, which has approxi-
mately 120 members. Id.
16 See Ware, 75 N.Y.2d at 117, 550 N.E.2d at 422, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 169; see also B.
WILSON, supra note 15, at 4 (separation from evil as primary duty of Christians emphasized
as early as 1836).
'7 Ware, 75 N.Y.2d at 117, 550 N.E.2d at 422, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 169.
'8 See supra note 14 (discussion of regulations).
Ware, 75 N.Y.2d at 117-18, 550 N.E.2d at 422, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 169. Valley Stream
High School includes 22 lessons concerning AIDS in its health education program. Id. These
lessons include topics such as, "Practice skills in saying no," "Know ways the AIDS virus
can and cannot be transmitted," and "Recognize and evaluate media messages regarding
sexuality." Id. at 118, 550 N.E.2d at 422-23, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 169-70. These lessons were
added to the curriculum in the second semester of the 1988-89 school year. Id. at 117-18,
550 N.E.2d at 422, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 169.
2 Id. The request was denied because the school district did not have the authority to
grant a complete exemption. Id. A subsequent petition to the New York State Commis-
sioner of Education was also denied. Id. at 119, 550 N.E.2d at 423, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 170. The
Brethren children were, however, granted an exemption from five lessons dealing with meth-
ods of prevention. Id. at 118, 550 N.E.2d at 422, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 169. These lessons included
classes on abstinence from illegal drug use, abstinence from sexual activity, and prevention
of the transmission of AIDS. See id. In denying a total exemption, the Commissioner
stressed the need to educate all children about AIDS, id. at 119, 550 N.E.2d at 423, 551
N.Y.S.2d at 170, and noted that there was no coercion to affirm a belief or engage in conduct
forbidden by the tenets of the Brethren's religious beliefs. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellants,
supra note 15, at 9 (quoting decision of Commissioner of Education).
" See Ware, 75 N.Y.2d at 118, 550 N.E.2d at 423, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 170.
22 See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellants, supra note 15, at 4. Brethren members are re-
quired "to abjure all sexual conduct and relations outside of marriage, to maintain personal
purity, to observe strictly ethical modes of conduct, [and] to obtain moral guidance in accor-
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materials presented under the AIDS educational program."
At the trial level, both plaintiffs and defendants moved for
summary judgment.2 ' Upon finding that the members of the
Brethren were integrated into the mainstream of society and that
the AIDS educational program would not conflict with their reli-
gious beliefs, and stressing that the state's interest in curbing the
AIDS epidemic was compelling,25 the trial court granted the de-
fendant's motion. Emphasizing the state's compelling interest, the
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York affirmed,
despite finding a possible burden on the plaintiffs' religious
freedom.2"
Upon review by the New York Court of Appeals, Judge Kaye,
in reliance on well-established precedent, held that the Brethren
initially must bear the burden of proof demonstrating that the
AIDS curriculum unconstitutionally infringed upon a sincerely
held religious belief 27 If met, the burden would then shift to the
dance with scriptural commands solely within their carefully insulated religious gathering."
Id. The Brethren's relationships outside of the community are kept to the absolute mini-
mum. Id. at 5. The religious and social associations of Brethren members are limited to the
Brethren community. Id. at 14. Brethren children are not permitted to associate with other
children either during or after school. Id. In addition, members do not use televisions or
radios, see movies, or read magazines. Id. at 31.
23 See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellants, supra note 15, at 24. The Brethren objected to the
fact that the information in the AIDS program is taught in a manner which does not com-
port with their moral values. See id. at 22. Their primary objection is that the program is
devoid of any connection between immoral conduct and the "fear of God" or the "fear of
eternal penalty," an essential component of their religious beliefs. See Reply Brief for Plain-
tiff-Appellants at 2, Ware, 75 N.Y.2d at 114, 550 N.E.2d at 420, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 167 (No.
89-3126).
The gravamen of the Brethren's suit was that requiring their children to attend classes
under New York's AIDS program infringed on their first amendment right to the free exer-
cise of religion. See Ware, 75 N.Y.2d at 120-21, 550 N.E.2d at 423-24, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 170-
71; Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 15, at 24. No claim was asserted under the free
exercise clause of the New York State Constitution, despite the fact that the New York
State Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that "[tihe free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be al-
lowed in this'state to all mankind." N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 3; see Ware, 75 N.Y.2d at 123 n.3,
550 N.E.2d at 426 n.3, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 173 n.3.
24 See Ware, 75 N.Y.2d at 121, 550 N.E.2d at 424, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 171.
22 See id. at 121, 550 N.E.2d at 425, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 172.
26 See id. at 122, 550 N.E.2d at 425, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 172.
2 See id. at 124, 550 N.E.2d at 426, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 173. In free exercise clause cases,
the Supreme Court has employed a two-step analysis. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
402-03 (1963); Lupu, supra note 7, at 934; Note, Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ.:
The Struggle to Balance Competing Constitutional Interests in the Public School Curricu-
lar, 42 ARK. L. REv. 519, 525 (1989) [hereinafter Note, School Curricular]; Comment, supra
note 9, at 299. The threshold inquiry is whether or not a sincerely held religious belief is
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state to show that the AIDS curriculum served a compelling state
interest which would be "substantially impede[d]" by granting an
exemption to the Brethren children."8 Applying this two-part anal-
ysis, the Ware court determined that there were disputed issues of
material fact, and thus a trial on the merits was required to deter-
mine whether: (1) the Brethren were "thoroughly integrated into
the larger society-and its evils"; (2) "the AIDS curriculum
pose[d] any threat to the continued existence of the Brethren as a
church community" and thus constitutes an "extreme injury";29 (3)
"the education [the Brethren] provide their children [has left]
them ill equipped to cope with the dangers of AIDS";30 and (4) the
state's compelling interest in the AIDS epidemic overrides any
burden which the Brethren might establish." Dissenting, Judge
Titone argued that the Ware court had before it all the relevant
facts and that, therefore, the plaintiffs' motion for summary judg-
ment should have been granted. 2 In contrast, Judge Bellacosa's
burdened by the government action. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 447 (1988); Lupu, supra note 7, at 934; Note, Native American First
Amendment Sacred Land Defense: An Exercise in Judicial Abandonment, 54 Mo. L. REV.
777, 780 (1989); Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause: A Model of
Competing Authorities, 90 YALE L.J. 350, 355 (1980) [hereinafter Note, Competing Authori-
ties]. Notably, however, this religious belief need not be based on membership in a particu-
lar sect or community. See Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 109 S.
Ct. 1514, 1517 (1989).
In Ware, the school district conceded the sincerity of the Brethren's religious beliefs.
See Ware, 75 N.Y.2d at 127, 550 N.E.2d at 428, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 175.
28 Ware, 75 N.Y.2d at 124, 550 N.E.2d at 426, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 173. Once a prima facie
case has been established by meeting the threshold inquiry, the state must demonstrate that
the regulation or government action is the least restrictive means of achieving the compel-
ling state interest at issue. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972); Fosmire v.
Nicoleau, 75 N.Y.2d 218, 221, 551 N.E.2d 77, 78, 551 N.Y.S.2d 876, 877 (1990); Note, The
Interests of the Child in the Home Education Question: Wisconsin v. Yoder Re-examined,
18 IND. L. REV. 711, 712 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Home Education]; Note, supra note 6, at
409.
20 Ware, 75 N.Y.2d at 127-28, 550 N.E.2d at 428-29, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 175-76.
20 Id. at 129, 550 N.E.2d at 430, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 177; see also Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235
(Amish demonstrated adequacy of their alternative to compulsory education).
21 Ware, 75 N.Y.2d at 128, 550 N.E.2d at 429, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 176.
"2 Id. at 131, 550 N.E.2d at 431, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 178 (Titone, J., dissenting). Judge
Titone also contended that the defendants had not met their burden of "[producing] evi-
dentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to require a trial." Id. (Titone, J., dissenting).
Judge Titone relied on prior New York Court of Appeals cases stating that mere conclusory
statements or unsupported allegations are insufficient to prevent summary judgment. Id.
(Titone, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Under New York law, the party opposing a summary judgment motion will be unsuc-
cessful if "in his opposing papers [he] cannot convince the court of the existence of [dis-
puted material issues]." N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 3212, commentary at 424 (McKinney
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dissent contended that the decision of the lower courts should have
been upheld,3" and contended that the "pervasive, voluntary inte-
gration of the Brethren... [into] their chosen communit[ies]" and
the compelling state interest in curtailing the spread of AIDS fore-
stalled any right of the Brethren to obtain an exemption on reli-
gious grounds.34 For a free exercise violation to exist, a court must
find that a government practice burdens the free exercise of reli-
gion and is not outweighed by a compelling state interest.35 This
Comment will submit that the court in Ware failed to recognize
that, as a matter of law, no burden was created on the Brethren's
free exercise of religion due to New York's compulsory AIDS edu-
cation program. It will further assert that, assuming arguendo, a
burden did exist, the Ware court was incorrect in finding that such
a burden was not outweighed by a compelling state interest as a
matter of law. Finally, this Comment will suggest that, by granting
the Brethren a trial on the merits, the court in Ware created a
potential establishment clause violation.
I. BURDEN ON RELIGIOUS BELIEFS
To establish a prima facie violation of the free exercise clause
of the first amendment, a plaintiff must show that a sincerely held
religious belief is burdened by government action.36 The United
States Supreme Court consistently has required government coer-
cion before finding such a burden.3 7 It is submitted that this kind
of unconstitutional coercion only exists where government action
1970). A motion for summary judgment may be denied if it appears that facts sufficient to
defeat it may exist, and the court is shown the sources through which the opposing party
believes the needed evidence can be secured. Id. at § 3212, commentary at 450 (referring to
N.Y. CIv. PRAc. L & R. § 3211, commentary at 53).
Ware, 75 N.Y.2d at 138, 550 N.E.2d at 435, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 182 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
34 Id. at 139, 550 N.E.2d at 436, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 183 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). The
"plaintiffs have not advanced sufficient proof ... to withstand defendant['s] . . . record
presentations of a dominant, compelling State interest." Id.
" See Yoder v. Wisconsin, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972). "[A] State's interest in universal
education ... is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental
rights and interests .... " Id.
" See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
'7 See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 450 (1988)
("Indirect coercion or penalties on free exercise of religion ... are subject to scrutiny under
the First Amendment"); see also Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248-49 (1968) (no
violation of free exercise clause where no coercion shown); Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (free exercise claim predicated on coercion).
1990]
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either compels an affirmation or denial of a religious belief, or re-
quires conduct which is proscribed by a religious belief.38 Under
this test, it is asserted that the Ware court should have found that
the Brethren failed, as a matter of law, to establish a burden of
constitutional magnitude because the Brethren children attending
public schools were not coerced to act in a manner forbidden by
their religious beliefs. The Brethren argued that "instruction by
school personnel concerning moral conduct in terms of sexual prac-
tices and drug use is violative of Brethren precepts."3 9 New York's
AIDS program, however, did not threaten the Brethren's religious
requirements since it did not seek to teach moral conduct, but was
designed to teach good health practices aimed at assisting an indi-
vidual to avoid contracting or spreading a deadly disease.40 Also, it
is important to note that Brethren dogma forbids members to en-
gage in "sexual conduct outside of marriage."'" Thus, since the
New York AIDS education program "stress[es] abstinence as the
most appropriate and effective ... protection against AIDS,"'42 it is
submitted that the program, in effect, supports and reinforces the
beliefs of the Brethren and accordingly cannot be interpreted to
burden or threaten the survival of those beliefs.
Further, the first amendment protection of the free exercise of
religion is not meant to prohibit mere exposure to ideas offensive
38 See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450. The government is not required to show compelling justi-
fication for programs "which may make it more difficult to practice certain religions but
which have no tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs."
Id. The government cannot force a person "to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion."
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961); Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827
F.2d 1058, 1066 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988). "It is clear that govern-
mental compulsion either to do or refrain from doing an act forbidden or required by one's
religion, or to affirm or disavow a belief required by one's religion, is the evil prohibited by
the Free Exercise Clause." Id.
11 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellants, supra note 15, at 4.
40 See Ware, 75 N.Y.2d at 116, 550 N.E.2d at 422, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 169. The regulations
require that students receive extensive instruction about AIDS. Id. "Each curriculum must
include instruction concerning the nature of the disease, methods of transmission and meth-
ods of prevention." Id. at 117, 550 N.E.2d at 422, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 169 (citation omitted).
"Recognizing the delicacy of some of the subject matter, the regulations further provide
that: '[n]o pupil shall be required to receive instruction concerning the methods of preven-
tion of AIDS if the parent or legal guardian of the pupil ... request[s] that the pupil not
participate in such instruction, with an assurance that the pupil will receive such instruction
at home.'" Id. (quoting [1987] 8 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 135.3(b)(2), (c)(2)); see also Mozert, 827
F.2d at 1064 (students not required to believe ideas in books).
41 Ware, 75 N.Y.2d at 120, 550 N.E.2d at 424, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 171.
12 Id. at 138, 550 N.E.2d at 435, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 182 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
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to certain religious beliefs.43 The first amendment guarantees that
"state schools will be neutral... [,] neither advocating a particular
religious belief nor expressing hostility to any or all religions.""
The Brethren in Ware argued, and it is asserted that the
Ware court mistakenly agreed, that the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder,'45 created a "mere excep-
tion" to the traditional free exercise analysis.46 The Brethren con-
tended that they fell within this "mere exposure exception" and
therefore their children were entitled to an exemption from state-
mandated AIDS education. 47 In Yoder, the Court held that the
Amish could not be compelled to send their children to school be-
yond the eighth grade, reasoning that this would place an imper-
missible burden on their constitutional right to their free exercise
of religion.48 The Brethren maintained that by granting such an
exemption to the Amish, the Court was declaring that exposure to
ideas antithetical to one's religion could constitute the requisite
burden in a free exercise claim.49
It is submitted that the court in Ware misinterpreted Yoder in
that Yoder did not create a "mere exposure exception" and that
Yoder is factually distinguishable. In Yoder, Wisconsin's policy of
compulsory education until age sixteen was deemed to be coercive
government action which burdened the beliefs of the Amish by re-
quiring them to act in a manner forbidden by their religious be-
liefs.5 0 Even if a "mere exposure exception" did exist, it is sug-
43 See Mozert v. Hawkins County Pub. Schools, 579 F. Supp. 1051, 1053 (E.D. Tenn.
1984) ("[tlhe First Amendment does not protect the plaintiffs from exposure to... antithet-
ical religious ideas"), rev'd, 765 F.2d 75 (6th Cir. 1985); see also Comment, supra note 9, at
299 (quoting Mozert court).
" Mozert v. Hawkins County Pub. Schools, 582 F. Supp. 201, 203 (E.D. Tenn. 1984). In
Mozert, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a mandatory
reading program did not constitute the requisite government coercion. Mozert v. Hawkins
County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1070 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied., 484 U.S. 1066
(1988). The Mozert court stated that the coercion must consist of "governmental compul-
sion either to do or refrain from doing an act forbidden or required by one's religion, or to
affirm or disavow a belief forbidden or required by one's religion." Id. at 1066. The court
also indicated that a violation might have existed had students been required to participate
beyond reading and discussing the material, or if a student had been disciplined for disput-
ing the ideas contained in the reading. Id. at 1064.
15 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
'6 Ware, 75 N.Y.2d at 125, 550 N.E.2d at 427, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 174.
47 Id.
41 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 219.
41 See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellants, supra note 15, at 24-32.
10 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218-19.
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gested that the Brethren would not fall within it due to significant
differences from the Amish in Yoder. The Amish live in separate
communities, wholly apart from the mainstream of society.5 1 In
contrast, the Brethren live and work within the mainstream of so-
ciety52 and do not even reside within the same communities.53 It is
asserted that the Ware court should have recognized this distinc-
tion, and as a matter of law, held that the behavior of the Brethren
constituted "integration within the larger society," and therefore
that Yoder was inapplicable.54
II. COMPELLING STATE INTEREST
A compelling state interest which cannot be achieved through
less restrictive means may justify an infringement on the right to
the free exercise of religion even where a prima facie case of a free
exercise clause violation has been established.55 In determining
whether an infringement exists, courts must balance the relevant
government interest and the burden which would be placed on the
government to accommodate the religious beliefs in question, and
the burden placed on the religious group's first amendment
rights. 6
The court in Ware conceded that the "[s]tate has a compelling
interest in controlling AIDS" and "in educating its youth about
AIDS. '57 It is submitted that the Ware court erred in falling to
",.See id. at 217.
52 Ware, 75 N.Y.2d at 120, 550 N.E.2d at 424, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 171; see Brief for Plain-
tiff-Appellants, supra note 15, at 4. In this respect, the, Brethren are more analogous to the
Apolistic Lutherans in Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395, 396 (D.N.H. 1974), because their
children, in their adulthood, will live and work within the mainstream of society. See id. at
400.
" See Ware, 75 N.Y.2d at 128, 550 N.E.2d at 428, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 175. The defendants
urged that the plaintiffs were not the "isolated religious community that was the subject of
Yoder." Id.
56 See Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 689 F. Supp. 106, 135 (N.D.N.Y. 1988), appeal dis-
missed, 866 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1989). The rule of Yoder is limited to religious communities
living "separate and apart from American society in general." Id.
"6 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963); see also Note, Native American First
Amendment Sacred Land Defense: An Exercise in Judicial Abandonment, 54 Mo. L. REv.
777, 780 (1989) (state has burden of showing compelling interest and that means used are
least restrictive).
11 See Menora v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 683 F.2d 1030, 1033 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1156 (1983).
7 Ware, 75 N.Y.2d at 128, 550 N.E.2d at 429, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 176. Halting the spread
of AIDS is the government's top health priority. See Gostin, Traditional Public Health
Strategies, AIDS AND THE LAW 47 (1987).
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recognize that, as a matter of law, this compelling state interest
outweighed any infringement on the free exercise rights asserted
by the Brethren. This position garners support from the fact that
although the Supreme Court has held that "only those interests of
the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance
legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion,"58 it has also rec-
ognized that "a community has the right to protect itself against
an epidemic. '59 In light of these pronouncements by the Court, it
can be inferred that a state can, when necessary, compel action
inimical to a citizen's religious beliefs.6 0
AIDS has been characterized as the modern-day black
plague. 1 Since its discovery in 1981, the number of cases has in-
creased from 316 to over 60,000.2 It is estimated that 1 million to
1.5 million people have been exposed to the AIDS virus within the
United States and that by the end of 1991, 179,000 to 270,000
Americans will have died from AIDS or AIDS-related complica-
tions. 3 It is submitted that even if the Brethren had established
the required burden on the free exercise of their religion, the court
in Ware should have taken judicial notice of these tragic statistics
5' Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
' Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905); see also Brown, AIDS Discrimina-
tion in the Workplace: The Legal Dilemma, 94 No. 6 CASE & COMMENT 44, 44 (1989) ("esti-
mated 1.5 million Americans are afflicted with the virus that causes AIDS, with a large
percentage of them expected to develop the full symptoms of the disease"). The Court's
decision in Jacobson has been interpreted as meaning that "for some purposes the good of
the whole is more important than the freedom of the part." W. PETERSON, THY LIBERTY IN
LAW 92 (1978).
Providing for the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens is the primary responsibility
of the state. See Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395, 404 (D.N.H. 1974). The state need not
present uncontroverted proof of a health hazard before legislating to control it. See
Marcicopa County Health Dep't v. Harmon, 156 Ariz. 161, 166, 750 P.2d 1364, 1369 (1987).
60 See W. PETERSON, supra note 59, at 93. Since "no person lives unto himself alone,"
the state may regulate action or inaction which threatens the health of others. Id.
", See Orlando & Wise, The AIDS Epidemic: A Constitutional Conundrum, 14 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 137, 137 (1985).
"2 See M. QUACKENBUSH & S. VILLAREAL, DoEs AIDS HURT: EDUCATING YOUNG CHIL-
DREN ABOUT AIDS 108 (1988); Orlando & Wise, supra note 61, at 144. An average of 11 new
cases of AIDS are reported daily. Id. After 1981, the number of reported cases doubled
every six months. See Osborne, The AIDS Epidemic: Discovery of a New Disease, AIDS
AND THE LAW 19 (1987). By 1987, the cases were doubling every 13 mionths. Id. In 1986, more
new cases were diagnosed than had been in the prior five years. Id. The mortality rate (pro-
portion of deaths to the total number of reported cases) is 47%, but the fatality rate (the
chance that a specific patient will die) is 100%. See Orlando & Wise, supra note 61, at 144.
'1 See I. SLOAN, supra note 13, at 2. The enormity of the AIDS statistics is obvious
"when compared with the approximately 292,000 Americans killed in World War II and the
58,000 Americans who lost their lives in Vietnam." See Brown, supra note 59.
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and found that, as a matter of law, such information would justify
any possible burden the compulsory AIDS education program
would place on the free exercise of the Brethren's religious beliefs.
In Yoder, the Amish succeeded in their free exercise challenge
because no overriding state interest justified the burden that state
compulsory education placed on the Amish religion.6 4 It is submit-
ted that, in contrast, a sufficiently compelling state interest did ex-
ist in Ware that would differentiate Ware from Yoder, and justify
the position that no constitutional violation existed despite the
limited burden found to exist by the appellate court. In fact, the
Yoder court seemed to indicate that there is such a distinction
when it included the caveat that Yoder was not a case "in which
any harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to the
public safety . . .has been demonstrated or may be properly in-
ferred. '6 5 It is asserted that the Ware court failed to recognize that
the AIDS epidemic falls squarely within this caveat.
Support for the view that Brethren children should not be ex-
empted from New York's AIDS program regardless of any limited
burden on their religious beliefs can be gleaned from the Supreme
Court's upholding of government coercion where the coerced con-
duct was the only effective method of preventing a life-threatening
disease.6 Currently, AIDS would qualify as such a disease as there
is no available vaccine against AIDS" and no known cure. 8 It is
presently believed that education is the best method of prevention
available.6 9 In fact, the Ware court conceded that education is "a
powerful weapon .. .and an essential component" in the fight
against AIDS." It is asserted that the Ware court should have rec-
ognized that education is the least restrictive means available to
64 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213.
Id. at 230.
66 See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905) (plaintiff compelled to be
vaccinated against smallpox despite objections).
67 See N.Y. Times, March 13, 1990, at C8, col. 4. Dr. Jonas Salk has recently tested a
vaccine which he developed. Id. Clergy members in Los Angeles have taken the vaccine
experimentally. See N.Y. Times, March 12, 1990, at 18.
6" See Orlando & Wise, supra note 61, at 144-45 (no effective AIDS treatment yet
available).
"' See Ware v. Valley Stream High School Dist., 150 App. Div. 2d 14, 20, 545 N.Y.S.2d
316, 320 (2d Dep't) (quoting Report of the Presidential Commission on the Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus Epidemic, June 1988, at 83), af'd as modified, 75 N.Y.2d 114, 550
N.E.2d 420, 551 N.Y.S.2d 167 (1989); see also Aiken, Education as Prevention, AIDS AND
THE LAW 90 (1987) (education is most effective way to stop spread of AIDS).
71 Ware, 75 N.Y.2d at 128, 550 N.E.2d at 429, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 176.
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prevent the spread .of AIDS, and thus would justify any burden
placed on the Brethren's free exercise of religion by compulsory
AIDS education.
III. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The first amendment right to the free exercise of religion is
not absolute.7 1 The establishment clause limits how far the govern-
ment can go in accommodating the free exercise rights of an indi-
vidual.7 2 The establishment clause also prohibits the government
from "placing its official stamp of approval upon one particular
kind of [religion]. 17 3 It is submitted that, by granting a trial on the
merits, the Ware court created the potential for a violation of the
establishment clause.
Allowing an exemption from a religiously neutral portion of a
school curriculum may conflict with the establishment clause by
giving the appearance of advancing religion or of favoring a partic-
ular religious sect.7 4 It is submitted, therefore, that to allow the
Brethren a total exemption from the New York AIDS program
71 Keller v. Gardner Community Consol. Grade School Dist., 552 F. Supp. 512, 514
(N.D. Ill. 1982); see also Note, Competing Authorities, supra note 27, at 360-61 (courts have
held that under certain circumstances "government may impose indirect burdens on the
exercise of religion").
72 Note, supra note 6, at 407 n.20. In the school setting, establishment clause values
must be weighed against the value of the free exercise of religion in determining whether to
accommodate one religion. See Buchanan, supra note 8, at 1031. Since the state must ac-
commodate itself to "external norms of conduct" when granting a religion-influenced ex-
emption, there is a risk of violating the establishment clause. See Note, Competing Authori-
ties, supra note 27, at 356.
73 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429 (1962). The establishment clause stemmed from
"an awareness of the historical fact that governmentally established religions and religious
persecution go hand in hand." See id. at 432. The primary purpose of the establishment
clause was to prevent the degradation of religion, which our Founders felt was "too personal,
too sacred, too holy, to permit its 'unhallowed perversion' by a civil magistrate." Id. at 432
(quoting MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS, II WRITINGS OF
MADISON 187).
The government must remain neutral in regard to religion. See Engel, 370 U.S. at 443
(Douglas, J., concurring). This neutrality protects and serves all religious sects. Id. (Douglas,
J., concurring). The government may not favor one religion over another, or religion over
nonreligion. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952); Comment, supra note 9, at 290
n.8 (Supreme Court cases indicate government can neither favor nor oppose religion or
nonreligion).
7' See Note, supra note 6, at 407, 410 (exemption from apparently neutral program
may appear to favor or advance religion). The establishment clause would be violated by a
religion-based exemption from a curriculum requirement if "other students might perceive
the school to be favoring, endorsing, or simply manifesting approval of the plaintiffs' reli-
gion." Id. at 447 (emphasis added).
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would violate the establishment clause, and that this violation
would supersede any incidental burden on the free exercise of reli-
gion. 5 The situation in Ware is distinguishable from others where
students have been permitted to opt out of certain classes on reli-
gious ground, because in other instances the classes in question
were noncore or noneducational in nature and thus the risk of a
perceived state endorsement was significantly diminished." In
Ware, the parents of Brethren children were seeking exemption
from a portion of a core subject, and it is therefore submitted that
the Ware court should have recognized that a trial on the merits
could lead to the granting of an exemption which fosters one reli-
gion over another-a direct violation of the establishment clause.
CONCLUSION
In Ware, the lack of impermissible government coercion
makes it apparent that the Brethren's right to the free exercise of
religion is not unconstitutionally burdened by the New York State
statute mandating AIDS education. However, even assuming, argu-
endo, that exposure to such ideas did constitute a burden, this
burden is clearly outweighed by the state's compelling interest in
curtailing the spread of AIDS. In addition, granting the Brethren's
request for an exemption would violate the establishment clause
because the state would be providing preferential treatment to one
specific religious sect. Granted, freedom of religion is one of our
most precious rights. However, where there is only an incidental
burden on that freedom, and that burden is necessitated by a com-
7 See Buchanan, supra note 8, at 1016 (school authorities permitted to honor estab-
lishment clause values over those of free exercise clause). But see Note, supra note 6, at 447
n.299 (free exercise principles should dominate establishment clause principles).
The primary objective of the framers of the first amendment was to prevent govern-
ment domination of religion. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 20 N.Y.2d 109, 121, 228 N.E.2d
791, 797, 281 N.Y.S.2d 799, 808 (1967) (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting), afl'd, 392 U.S. 236
(1968); see also Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161, 180, 100 N.E.2d 463, 473 (1951) (Desmond,
J., concurring) (first amendment was necessary to prevent Congress from making laws to
"infringe the rights of conscience, and establish a national religion." (quoting 1 ANNALS OF
CONG. 758 (1789)), afl'd, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
The intention of the framers as to the scope of the free exercise clause is far from clear.
See Note, Competing Authorities, supra note 27, at 352. It has been suggested that the
framers themselves may have had conflicting intentions. See id. at 352 n.16. Thus, while
Madison may have endorsed religion-based exemptions, his view may not have been shared
by his co-authors. See id.
" See Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395, 402 (D.N.H. 1974) (students could be excused
when audio-visual equipment was used for noneducational reasons).
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pelling state interest which cannot be achieved by less restrictive
means, courts must not blindly adhere to the ideal of freedom of
religion at the expense of potentially grave injury to the whole of
society.
Donna Marie Werner

